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Abstract
Denying the conclusion of a valid argument is not generally permissible if one suspends on one premise of the argument and believes the other premise(s). This can
happen when one’s only critique of an argument is to undermine one premise. There
is incoherence there. Here I examine how this is relevant to the debate on evolutionary debunking of our moral knowledge. I argue that one significant line of response
to the debunker is unsuccessful: merely undermining the debunker’s empirical
claim. It is not rational to respond this way and believe one has moral knowledge.
First I present evidence that prominent critics of the debunking argument merely
undermine the debunker’s empirical claim. Then I argue for two premises: (1)
merely undermining a premise can only justify a middling amount of doubt towards
the premise and (2) we should have no more doubt about the conclusion of a valid
argument than we do about the premises. Implications of the argument are explored.
Keywords Moral epistemology · Evolutionary debunking · Undermining defeaters ·
Undercutting defeaters · Suspension of judgment · Agnosticism

1 Introduction
Three characters—Theist, Atheist, and Agnostic—walk into a bar. The newspaper on the table reports chaos and tragic suffering around the world. Agnostic asks
Theist a question. “Could God really co-exist with the amount of suffering in the
world?” Upon reflection Theist responds “I really don’t know. I guess I’m agnostic
about whether God could co-exist with the amount of suffering in the world, but that
doesn’t shake my belief that God exists!”.
What’s going on here? It seems that Theist is incoherent, but how? Theist doesn’t
go so far as to affirm a contradiction, nor to affirm propositions that entail a contradiction. Theist is in the following state:

Believe
Suspend
Believe

(Suffering S obtains)
(If S obtains then God does not exist)
(God does exist)

or perhaps:
Very High Credence
Middling Credence
Very High Credence

(Suffering S obtains)
(If S obtains then God does not exist)
(God does exist)

In the latter case the incoherence is probabilistic, in the former case it is harder
to specify, but in both cases it looks like Theist is likely in an irrational state. This
paper explores how a certain way of responding to the evolutionary debunking argument leaves us in the same position.
We can regiment the evolutionary debunking argument as follows1:
Evolutionary Debunking argument
(1) Epistemological premise: If our method for forming moral judgments is not
truth-conducive or is accidentally truth-conducive, then none of our moral
judgments amount to knowledge.
(2) Empirical premise: Influenced as it is by evolution, our method for forming
moral judgments is not truth-conducive or is accidentally truth-conducive.
(3) None of our moral judgments amount to knowledge.
Section 2 differentiates three ways of responding to the debunker’s argument: a
constructivist way, a Moorean way, and an undermining way. The rest of the paper
examines and critiques the undermining response. In Sect. 3 I defend the claim that
our doxastic attitudes towards the premises of an argument rationally constrain our
doxastic attitude towards the conclusion of the argument—specifically, we should
have no more doubt about the conclusion of a valid argument than we do about the
premises. In Sect. 4 I argue that merely undermining a premise can only justify an
agnostic-like state or middling amount of doubt towards a premise. Section 5 applies
the work of Sects 3, 4 to the evolutionary debunking argument showing that merely
undermining the empirical premise does not rationally allow denying the debunker’s
conclusion. One who employs this mere undermining response ought to, by her own
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Morton (2018) gives a similar two premise—epistemological and empirical—regimentation. Here I
use the non-accidentally truth-conducive condition, but as mentioned below (Sect. 5) my argument does
not rest on formulating the debunker’s argument with this particular condition for knowledge.

lights, be agnostic about whether she has moral knowledge. Section 6 explores the
implications of my argument for our moral judgments.

2 Three strategies for saving moral knowledge
As just noted, evolutionary debunking arguments make an empirical claim and an
epistemological claim. The empirical claim is that our evolutionary history has
resulted in moral judgments that are accidentally correct if correct at all. The epistemological claim is that being accidentally correct is incompatible with knowledge.
So we do not have moral knowledge. There are multiple strategies intended to rescue
moral knowledge from the debunker. Here I will contrast three.
The first strategy is the Constructivist Strategy. The constructivist thinks the best
response to the debunkers’ challenge is to deny that moral facts are true independent of what we (would, in reflective equilibrium,) think or feel about them (Street,
2006, 2008). What makes it wrong to indiscriminately kill people is roughly that we
(would, in reflective equilibrium,) think it is wrong and/or feel negatively toward
that activity. The fact that our attitudes are correct is not accidental after all because
the correctness of our attitudes is grounded in our having just those attitudes. So
the debunker’s empirical premise is false. It is false that our evolutionary history
has resulted in moral judgments that are accidentally correct if correct at all. We
construct the moral facts and since it is of their nature to be constructed by us, our
evolutionary history is not a threat to our moral knowledge.2
The second strategy is the Moorean Strategy. Moore (1939) famously responded
to the external world skeptic by raising his hands and saying “Here is one hand and
here is another.” Therefore “two human hands exist at this moment.” The Moorean
Strategy involves starting with some point that is putatively up for debate and using
that to argue against one’s opponent. So the external world skeptic thinks it is up for
debate whether Moore’s hand-wavy gesture is reason to believe hands exist at all. As
the skeptic sees it, it is an open question whether there is a hand. Likewise, Moorean
responses to the evolutionary debunker start their response with something that is
putatively up for debate, for example: survival-promoting behavior is good (Enoch,
2011); society’s basic needs are best served by adopting moral standards (Copp,
2007, 2008); life-affirming moral beliefs are reliable (Dogramaci, 2017). From there
they argue that the debunker’s empirical premise is false. It is false that our evolutionary history has resulted in moral judgments that are objectionably accidental.
These responses rely on substantive moral claims, either evaluative or normative, to
respond to an argument that we have no substantive moral knowledge.
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Berker (2014) argues that the constructivist is no better situated to respond to the argument than the
moral realist.

A number of critiques are Moorean,3 but as Kelly (2008) has noted, “many would
hold that there is something deeply objectionable about dismissing skeptical theories on such Moorean grounds.” Indeed, in his estimation “perhaps most philosophers—or at least a significant plurality,” take issue with Moorean responses. This
leads to another strategy.
The third strategy is the Mere Undermining Strategy. Call those who employ
this strategy Mere Underminers. Mere Underminers focus on the weak support for
the debunker’s empirical premise. Rather than arguing that the empirical premise
is false as the Constructivist and Mooreans do, Mere Underminers argue that the
premise is unsubstantiated.
On one interpretation of Shafer-Landau, FitzPatrick, and Vavova, they claim that
we can undermine the debunker’s empirical premise and that undermining the premise is enough to reject the debunker’s conclusion. Following are some passages that
support this interpretation. Keep in mind that each of these philosophers rejects the
debunker’s conclusion that we lack moral knowledge.
Shafer-Landau (2012) seems to state the position explicitly: “Until such a time
as we can mount a successful formal strategy for vindicating the reliability of our
moral faculties, moral realists will have to focus directly on trying to undermine at
least one premise of the Darwinian Argument…. All the realist needs is to show that
[the premise] is inadequately supported.”4
FitzPatrick represents his own argument as one that “does undermine the more
ambitious attacks on realism.” (emphasis added, 2014) He says “the key to defusing the debunking arguments lies in distinguishing between the real science associated with evolutionary theory and the debunker’s overreaching explanatory claims.”
(emphasis added, 2014) And “it’s just not true that ‘the empirical data concerning
human evolution’ support anything approaching [the] premise…. (i) the science
doesn’t tell us how pervasive the evolutionary influence on our current beliefs is,
and (ii) even where there is such influence we have no reason to suppose it’s vastly
more incidentally distorting than it is incidentally supporting.” (emphasis added,
2015) Like Shafer-Landau, FitzPatrick’s attacks seem to merely assert that a premise
of the debunker’s argument is inadequately supported.
Vavova’s overall strategy, as I understand it, creates a dilemma for the debunker.
Either we can adopt the Moorean strategy above or we cannot rely on any of our
moral judgments. On the first horn of the dilemma we can adopt the Moorean strategy and thereby have an adequate response to the debunker. But Vavova (2015)
says that the Moorean Strategy seems “more or less directly question begging.” If
we cannot adopt the Moorean Strategy, then we cannot rely on any of our moral
judgments.
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See also White (2010), Wielenberg (2010) and Schafer (2010). Each Moorean response is much more
sophisticated and nuanced than I have indicated here, but they share the idea that we can appeal to some
substantive moral judgments in our response to the debunker.
4
Shafer-Landau (2012) does say that moral beliefs are “strongly presumptively warranted.” This suggests that Shafer-Landau may embrace a Moorean strategy.

…morality could be about anything. And if morality could be about anything,
then we have no idea what morality is about. So we have no reason to think
that the attitude-independent truths and the adaptive beliefs don’t overlap. But
without that, we have no sense of what the chances are that we are mistaken.
Therefore, we cannot get to the conclusion that we probably are mistaken.
(emphasis added, 2014)
That is, on the second horn of the dilemma we lose reason to think the empirical
premise is true—the premise is undermined.5
All three authors seem to claim that the crucial issue with the debunker’s argument is that the empirical premise is unjustified rather than that it is false. They
may indeed think it is false, but the reasons they give for not accepting it are merely
undermining. Perhaps this is a wrong interpretation of these three authors. In any
case I think the position is of independent interest and a tempting one. Rather than
establish that the debunker’s premise is false, the Mere Underminer is content to
establish that we shouldn’t believe the debunker’s premise.
As we will see below, however, not believing is not enough to permit denying
the debunker’s conclusion and so the Mere Undermining Strategy does not save
moral knowledge. The Mere Undermining Strategy partially deflects the debunker’s blow—it shows that the debunker hasn’t yet given us sufficient reason to think
we don’t have moral knowledge—but it conflicts with the position that we want to
hold—that we have moral knowledge.

3 Doxastic constraints in valid arguments
To show that the Mere Undermining Strategy conflicts with a claim to moral knowledge I will first argue that the collective amount of doubt we have in the premises
of a valid argument sets a limit on the amount of doubt we can rationally have in
the conclusion. I will work this idea out first in terms of traditional doxastic states
(belief, suspension, disbelief) and then in terms of credences. This will be relevant
because, as I will discuss in Sect. 4, undermining justifies some doubt in the premises but not enough for a coherent denial of the conclusion.
When evaluating an argument, it is not uncommon to take a two step procedure:
check for validity and check for true premises. If the argument fails at either step,
then it is unsound and can be rejected. This method is fine as far as it goes, but if the
second step is practiced without sensitivity to which specific doxastic attitudes we
take towards the premises, we may be lead to ignore an argument unjustifiably.
Say an argument is valid, or can be made so, and we want to check for the truth
of the premises. Here traditional doxastic attitudes are helpful. You can believe a
premise, disbelieve it (logically equivalent to believing the negation), or suspend
judgment. Following Friedman (2013), I am thinking of suspension of judgment as
“an attitude that expresses or represents or just is one’s neutrality or indecision about

5

See also Vavova (forthcoming).

which of p, ¬p is true.” Accordingly, suspension is different from having no attitude
towards a proposition. Barring a lack of the relevant concepts, once we have considered a premise to check for its truth, we would (almost without exception6) have
some doxastic attitude towards the premise. If you rationally disbelieve a premise,
then you are rational to ignore the argument—that argument does not provide reason
for you to revise your belief about the conclusion.7 But what if a premise is one that
you should neither believe nor disbelieve?
We might think that if we do not believe every premise of the argument, then the
argument has failed the truth test (as far as we are concerned) and therefore allows
us to reject the conclusion. This would be a mistake. We need to be sensitive to the
fact that an argument can fail to pass the truth-test in two ways: when we believe
it has a false premise (disbelieve a premise) or when we take an attitude of suspension toward a premise. When it fails in this latter way, we cannot just reject the
conclusion.
Consider the following example:
Coin game argument
(1) If the coin flip is heads, then I win.
(2) The coin flip is heads.
(3) I win.
Premise 1 lays out the rules of the game we are playing. What should I think of
this argument before the coin is flipped? Clearly I should not believe (2) but I also
should not disbelieve it. Rather I should suspend judgment about (2). What should I
believe about the conclusion? I should neither believe nor disbelieve (3). Rather, in
the absence of any other evidence that I win, I should suspend judgment about (3).8
Is affirming (3) rationally compatible with suspending on (2)? It could be. There
could be other relevant evidence that supports the conclusion, for example, if it is
true in this (admittedly boring) game, that on tails you also win. But, believing (1),
is denying (3) rationally compatible with suspending on (2)? It is not and could not
be. Any evidence against (3) must also lower your confidence in some premise. Say I
have justification for disbelieving (3)—the oracle told me I will not win the game—
then I would know that the coin will not come up heads. The rules of the game entail
this.9 Failing to believe some premise does not mean that I can reject the conclusion.
Why is this? We might say there is a general principle that can be stated as follows:
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Friedman (2013) Sect. 3.1 provides some exceptions.
I am assuming here that the argument is minimal in that all of its premises are used to deduce the conclusion. If it has extra premises and you disbelieve one of those while accepting the rest, then that argument still provides reason for you to accept the conclusion.
8
And the same would be true if I suspended judgment about (1) instead of (2) (imagine I see the coin
flip is heads, but the rule of the game about which of heads/tails is the winner is sealed in an envelope).
9
I am assuming closure of propositional justification across known entailment but I am not assuming
transmission of propositional justification across known entailment. Though closure of justification is not
without its critics (see Avnur (2012)), it is widely endorsed.
7

Argument Rule	For a valid argument, it is irrational to suspend judgment
about one premise, believe the rest of the premises (if
any), and disbelieve the conclusion.10
The Argument Rule seems plausible when we are talking about sufficiently short
arguments. We could generate many confirming instances of this rule by taking a
short argument and ascribing the relevant doxastic states to a subject. It will be intuitive over and over again that the subject is somehow irrational or incoherent if they
suspend on one premise, believe the other (if any), and disbelieve the conclusion. In
the Coin Game the intuition is generated when we consider a person who believes
they will lose the game (disbelieves the conclusion) but suspends on whether the
coin flip will be heads while believing that if it is heads then they win. Something is
wrong with that. Likewise in my opening example Theist believes God exists while
believing suffering S obtains but suspending on the conditional if S obtains, then
God does not exist. This violates the Argument Rule for the following argument:
Atheist argument
(1) If suffering S obtains, then God does not exist.
(2) S obtains.
(3) God does not exist.
The Argument Rule, however, seems to have some exceptions. Reflection on
Kyburg’s (1961) Lottery Paradox and Makinson’s (1965) Preface Paradox should
show that the Argument Rule is not universal. In those cases it would seem you can
believe all the premises of a very long argument but also disbelieve the conclusion
without transgressing any rational constraints. And of course if you can believe all
the premises and disbelieve the conclusion, then it is no surprise that it is rational
to believe all the premises, except for one which you suspend on, and disbelieve the
conclusion. Nevertheless, we need not rely on a principle and infer that something is
wrong in these short arguments. The reason the principle looked appealing to begin
with is because we can see that something is wrong in the specific cases cited.11
So far we have been thinking through these arguments with the traditional doxastic attitudes in mind: belief, suspension of judgment, and disbelief. And we have
seen that we need to be sensitive to how a premise is not believed. The force of an
argument will be different when a premise is disbelieved than when one suspends
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Rosa (2020) explores and defends rational requirements like the Argument Rule for arguments where
one suspends on a premise. McGrath (forthcoming) explicitly endorses an instance of the rule: “if I am
agnostic about whether supernatural beings exist and I know that if God exists there are supernatural
beings, then I cannot, without irrationality, believe that God exists.”
11
Rosa (2019) argues that while we cannot affirm a general principle that it is irrational to suspend judgment about one premise, believe the rest of the premises (if any), and disbelieve the conclusion, we can
affirm a general principle that one has a reason not to be in that state. I think one has a defeasible defeater
for the set (or at least one) of those doxastic attitudes. A defeater is different than a reason, but I cannot
develop this theory here.

on the premise. The Argument Rule helps us increase our doxastic sensitivity when
evaluating arguments, but it is not universally applicable. Formal epistemology
provides more resources that can explain why the Argument Rule coheres with our
intuitions about short arguments but not to our intuitions about very long arguments.
We can model our doxastic states with a credence function ascribing a number from 0 to 1 to each proposition we have taken an attitude towards. Most of our
beliefs will not be modeled with a 0 or a 1.12 We are usually less than maximally
confident. In these cases even though one may have a high credence in a premise,
one will still have some doubt about it. So even though I am highly confident that I
will go home tonight, I am aware that circumstances could arise where I do not end
up going home tonight. I ascribe the lot of these scenarios very little credence, but
insofar as I give them any credence then I have some degree of uncertainty about
whether I will go home tonight. Call the degree to which your credence falls short
of certainty, your uncertainty. With these notions of credence and uncertainty in
mind, we can now see why the Argument Rule looks good in the case of short arguments but looks bad in the case of long arguments like the paradoxes cited above.
The sum total of your uncertainties for all the premises of an argument are like a
maximum allocation of uncertainty that you can spend in the conclusion. You cannot have more uncertainty about the conclusion than is allotted by the sum of the
uncertainties you have in the premises. In the case of short arguments, a small bit
of uncertainty in each of the few premises does not allow for a lot of uncertainty to
accumulate. But in the case of much longer arguments like the Lottery and Preface
cases, a small bit of uncertainty in each of the many premises adds up to allow for a
lot of uncertainty in the conclusion.
Formally it looks like this. Following Adams and Levine (1975), the uncertainty of a premise is equal to one’s credence in a premise subtracted from 1, or
U(p) = 1—C(p), where U(p) is your uncertainty in p and C(p) is your credence in p.
So if you have a 0.7 credence in a premise, your uncertainty in that premise is 0.3. A
constraint on the relationship between one’s uncertainties in the premises and one’s
uncertainty in the conclusion of a valid argument can be stated with the Uncertainty
Rule:
Uncertainty
Rule

Where p1-pn are an arguments premises, c is the conclusion, and
the argument is deductively valid, U(c) ≤ U(p1)+ … +U(pn).13

In other words, your uncertainty in the conclusion of a valid argument must be less
than or equal to the sum of your uncertainties in the premises of that argument. This
Uncertainty Rule gives us a precise lower bound for the probability of the conclusion
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There are hard questions here about the relationship between belief/suspension and credence. For the
purposes of this paper we can assume that belief, suspension, and disbelief are associated with high, middling, and low credence. Ultimately, however, I find that view unsatisfactory. I argue that there are no
good credal accounts of belief, suspension, and disbelief in del Rio (manuscript).
13
See also Adams (1998), 31–53. These premises need not be probabilistically independent.

of the argument, given the probabilities of the premises.14 For example, according to
the Uncertainty Rule, someone who places a credence of 1.0 in the first premise of
Coin Game Argument and a credence of 0.5 in the second premise is probabilistically incoherent if they have a credence less than 0.5 in the conclusion.
We have seen in this section that we must be sensitive to the doxastic attitudes
we have towards the premises of arguments. If we want to reject the conclusion of
an argument, then we need to pay attention to more than just whether we believe
the premises. Rather we need to pay attention to our degree of confidence in the
premises. Even if we do not believe all the premises, ascribing some credence to
the premises can place a constraint on how low our confidence can be in the conclusion. In a short two-premise argument, if we have a high degree of confidence in
one premise and a middle credence in the other premise, we will be probabilistically
incoherent if we take a low credence in the conclusion.15 This is precisely the state
which Theist was in and in which we find ourselves if we merely undermine the
debunker.

4 Doxastic results of mere undermining
Mere Underminers find themselves in this state because mere undermining only
justifies an agnostic-like attitude. An undermining defeater shows that some evidence E that (purportedly) justified believing some proposition p does not in fact
(sufficiently) support believing p. Merely undermining a premise does not give
you reason to believe its negation, but it does give you reason not to believe that
premise. As Sturgeon (2014) argues, undermining defeaters “do not make for reasons to believe.” Bergmann (2006) says this is the differentiating feature between
rebutting and undercutting defeaters—undercutting (or undermining) defeaters do
not provide reason for thinking a defeated claim is false while rebutting defeaters do. Therefore, on its own, undermining supports taking a neutral doxastic
attitude. “The under[mining] defeater gives me reason to be an agnostic.” (Bergmann, 2005).
Consider the following proposition:
Even Stars

There are an even number of stars.

14
Another way of getting a similar result is to employ the Entailment Rule: (A ⊨ B) → P(A) ≤ P(B).
Since the premises of a valid argument entail the conclusion, the conclusion cannot have a lower probability than the conjunction of the premises. This method can create a higher lower bound than the
Uncertainty Rule, and so is more constraining. However it is less user friendly since the probability of
the conjunction of the premises must be calculated, taking into account whether or not the premises are
probabilistically independent. The Uncertainty Rule will always provide a lower bound that is equal to
or less than the lower bound provided by the Entailment Rule. My argument is given using the weaker
constraint.
15
For the purposes of this paper I will assume that identified probabilistic incoherence is irrational.
Details for a view like this are worked out in Dogramaci (2018).

Say I believe this because a scientist told me that each star has one and only
one twin star somewhere in the universe. This belief of mine can be undermined
if the scientist tells me that she was just pulling my leg about the twin stars. This
undermines my belief in Even Stars—Even Stars is not sufficiently supported by
my total evidence. I can now see that the scientist’s original testimony is not sufficient support for Even Stars. But notice that undermining a proposition does
not in any way suggest that it is false. I should not believe that there are an odd
number of stars! On their own, undermining defeaters push us to suspension of
judgment or a middle credence, not to disbelief or a low credence.
One might object that Even Stars stacks the deck against the Mere Underminer.
Of course we ought to suspend judgment about Even Stars. There are either an
even or an odd number and we have no evidence one way or the other. That is just
a paradigmatic case for suspension. It is true that there are just an even or odd
number. Two options. But the same two options exist for every proposition; it’s
true or its negation is true (Odd Stars is just the negation of Even Stars).
The reason Even Stars is a fitting example is because it is clearly a case where
no rebutting evidence is available. We want that to be the case because we are
trying to isolate the force of mere undermining. Mere undermining of p only
removes reason for believing p. It does not provide reason to disbelieve p. It is
true that removing epistemic reason for a subject S to believe p might create a situation where disbelieving p is epistemically rational for S. But that is because of
antecedent epistemic reason for disbelieving p—that is rebutting evidence. None
of these cases will be cases of mere undermining.
For example, consider the case of Magic Mike.
Magic Mike

a magician, Mike, selects from four pieces of paper each designating a suit—hearts, diamonds, spades, clubs. He places one
piece of paper in an envelope, concealing which one it is. He
then shuffles a deck of cards and asks me to pick a card. Mike
says the envelope contains the suit of the card I will pick. I draw
the six of hearts. But before I look in the envelope, I find out by
some trustworthy means that Mike is not a magician at all and is
only pretending to perform a trick.

For the sake of argument, let’s assume that trusting Mike’s testimony while I
thought he was a magician yields justified beliefs. Then this is a case where I
gained a justified belief in Hearts.
Hearts

The content of the envelope says “hearts.”

My belief was then undermined. But Hearts isn’t merely undermined. I have some
evidence that Hearts is false, for now I know that Mike picked a suit randomly and
the chance of randomly getting the matching suit is 1/4. I have rebutting evidence
that is crucially relevant in rejecting Hearts. Perhaps disbelief that Hearts is not
in order. Nevertheless, this case is not fitting for illustrating the consequences of
undermining by itself. The only fitting cases for understanding the force of mere

undermining are cases where no rebutting evidence is available. All such cases are
like Even Stars. Hence Sturgeon’s and Bergmann’s claims above that undermining
only gives reason for agnosticism.
In this section I have argued that mere undermining of p requires an agnostic attitude towards p. In the previous section I argued that taking an agnostic attitude towards
one premise of a valid two-premise argument (while endorsing the other premise) is
not rationally compatible with denying the conclusion. We are now ready to apply
these points to the Mere Underminer of the evolutionary debunking argument.

5 Doxastic constraints on mere underminers of the debunking
argument
Again the evolutionary debunking argument can be stated as follows:
Evolutionary Debunking argument
(1) Epistemological premise: If our method for forming moral judgments is not
truth-conducive or is accidentally truth-conducive, then none of our moral
judgments amount to knowledge.
(2) Empirical premise: Our method for forming moral judgments is not truthconducive or is accidentally truth-conducive.
(3) None of our moral judgments amount to knowledge.
What makes the argument evolutionary is the evolutionary considerations offered
in support of premise 2.16 What makes it a debunking argument is that it asserts that
some condition for knowledge is not satisfied. I think the argument is best built on a
non-accidentally truth-conducive condition as defended by Yamada (2011), but my
charge against the Mere Underminer is consistent with debunking arguments that
use other conditions for knowledge, such as a reliability condition or a proper function condition.17
The argument is valid. So however much we want to doubt the conclusion, we
need at least that much doubt to arise in the premises. In other words, if we want to
disbelieve or have a very low credence in the conclusion, we need sufficient uncertainty in the premises. Merely failing to believe a premise does not get us off the
hook of this argument.
Now we might just disbelieve the empirical premise because we believe moral
claims that entail the conclusion is false and we believe the epistemological premise is true. That would be to employ a Moorean strategy. Everything I’ve said here
is compatible with the Moorean strategy succeeding. I am evaluating a kind of
strategy that is supposed to satisfy those with anti-Moorean sentiments. The Mere

16
My purposes do not require me to go into these consideration here. See Joyce (2001, 2005), Mackie
(1977), Street (2006) and Vavova (2015).
17
See also Schafer (2014) and Setiya (2012) for defense of a non-accidentality condition.

Undermining Strategy is one such strategy. There are others. For example, one might
argue on theistic grounds that the empirical premise is false. If we know God exists
and foreordained the evolutionary process to produce in us moral knowledge, then the
empirical evidence from evolution is undermined and the premise is rebutted. That
is, we might take their to be independent and sufficiently strong reasons for thinking
God guarantees that our moral beliefs are formed in a non-accidentally truth-conducive way. Such anti-Moorean strategies may succeed, though Street (2014) argues
they do not. My thesis is that the Mere Undermining strategy cannot succeed.
Grant that the Mere Underminer does undermine the premise of the debunker’s
argument. Undermining a premise does not give you reason to believe its negation.
Therefore, if one’s only critique of the argument is to undermine a premise, then one
should suspend judgment or take a middle credence on that premise. Taking either
of these attitudes towards the empirical premise (while granting the epistemological
premise) requires not also believing we have moral knowledge. So the Mere Underminer is irrational if she believes she has moral knowledge. Put another way, Mere
Underminers cannot rationally deny the debunker’s conclusion—they cannot believe
they have moral knowledge and be rational.

6 Further implications
One might object: “What I really care about are my moral judgments, not whether
I know I have moral knowledge.” This objection accepts the conclusion that the
Mere Underminer can’t rationally believer she has moral knowledge, but asks why
we should care about rationally believing that we have moral knowledge. After all,
my argument is not that particular moral judgments, like “slavery is wrong,” are
unknown, much less unjustified. Yet the argument may well have this consequence.
The first thing to be said is that the Mere Underminer will have to undergo some
drastic belief revision about what she knows—presuming that she takes herself to
know all kinds of moral facts. For it isn’t just the general claim of moral knowledge
that is rationally incompatible with mere undermining. Say the Mere Underminer
takes a credence of 0.5 in the empirical premise and accordingly 0.5 in the conclusion that none of our moral judgments amount to knowledge, as I argue is required.
Can they still think they know particular moral judgments, like slavery is wrong?
No. Consider the following argument:
Particular moral judgment argument
(1) If none of my moral judgments amount to knowledge, then my moral judgment that slavery is wrong doesn’t amount to knowledge.
(2) None of my moral judgments amount to knowledge.
(3) My moral judgment that slavery is wrong doesn’t amount to knowledge.
The same line of reasoning that led us to take a middle credence about the conclusion of the evolutionary debunking argument will lead us to a middle credence in

the conclusion of this argument. (1) is necessarily true. Say we assign it a credence
of 1. (2) is the conclusion of the debunking argument which we have now assigned
a credence of 0.5. Therefore there is a total sum of 0.5 for the uncertainty of the
premises. So we can have less than or equal to 0.5 uncertainty in the conclusion
of this argument. In terms of credences, we can have a credence of 0.5 or greater
in this conclusion. Anything less is probabilistically incoherent. Agnosticism about
whether one knows slavery is wrong is presumably undesirable.
The second thing to be said is that even the Mere Underminer’s first order moral
judgments may be in jeopardy. There are at least two ways of making things worse
for the Mere Underminer. The first way employs a principle that says suspension of
judgment towards whether you know p, makes it irrational to believe p. The second
way employs a principle that says suspension of judgment about whether your belief
that p was formed in a non-accidentally truth-conducive way, makes it irrational to
believe p. Either way the Mere Underminer’s moral judgments will be irrational.
Huemer (2007, 2011) defends what he calls the Metacoherence Requirement:
Metacoherence
requirement (MR)

Categorically believing that p commits one, on
reflection, to the view that one knows that p.

This principle states that rationality demands a coherence between our first order
beliefs and our higher order beliefs about whether the first order beliefs amount to
knowledge. If we believe that it is raining outside and we reflect on whether we
know it, we must conclude that we do or else stop believing that it is raining. Huemer (2011) says “If one believes that p, and one either denies or withholds that one
knows that p, then, according to MR, one exhibits a sort of irrationality in virtue of
the clash between one’s two attitudes.” The primary reason for this comes from what
Huemer calls Moore-paradoxical sentences—sentences like ‘It is true that it’s raining, but I do not believe it is true that it’s raining’ and ‘It is true that it’s raining, but
I do not know that it is true that it’s raining.’ There is, according to Huemer, something irrational about even thinking these things. Linguistic conventions and rules of
assertion cannot explain this fact, but the Metacoherence Requirement does. We can
restate the principle like this:
MR*

If, upon reflection, one should not believe that one’s belief p
amounts to knowledge, then one should not believe p.

But recall that we have concluded above that the Mere Underminer should not,
upon reflection, believe that her moral judgment—call it m—amounts to knowledge.
Therefore, according to MR*, the Mere Underminer should not believe m. The Mere
Underminer should neither believe that she knows slavery is wrong, nor that slavery
is wrong.18
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The same result looks like it comes from the knowledge norm of belief: one ought only believe p if
one’s belief that p would amount to knowledge (Williamson, 2000). Since the Mere Underminer must
believe m does not amount to knowledge, accepting the knowledge norm of belief means that she should
not, by her own lights, believe m.

Bergmann (2005) gets to this conclusion directly from the Mere Underminer’s
suspension on the empirical premise. Bergmann writes:
If you are considering whether the actual basis of your belief that p is indicative of p’s truth and you find yourself resisting the belief that it is (because you
have considered the matter and you have no idea whether it supports p or not),
that seems to undercut your justification for believing p in the same way as if
you believed outright that the actual basis for your belief that p did not indicate
p’s truth.19
He motivates the point with a case. Say you find yourself in a factory looking
through a window with a narrow field of view at some widgets traveling down a
conveyor belt. They look red to you and you form the belief < The widgets are red > .
Then another spectator asks you if the widgets are red or if there is a red light shining on them. You consider the higher-order question of whether you formed your
belief in a reliable way. Having no idea whether the higher-order proposition is true,
you suspend judgment on the matter. This also gives you, according to Bergmann, a
defeater for your belief that the widgets are red. You should suspend judgment about
whether the widgets are red.
But this seems to be just the sort of case we have with the evolutionary explanation of our moral judgments. We are asked to reflect on whether the actual basis for a
moral belief m is indicative of m’s truth. The Mere Underminer must suspend judgment on the matter. But that defeats her justification for believing m at all. Again, the
Mere Underminer should neither believe that she knows m, nor believe m.20
So if the argument of this paper is correct, Mere Undermining requires a substantive skepticism about whether we know particular moral judgments, and if the
extended arguments of Huemer or Bergmann are correct, then skepticism about each
of our particular moral judgments is required as well.

7 Concluding remarks
In closing, I want to emphasize the limited scope of this argument but also its
broader implications. I am not arguing that the debunker is successful, nor that the
debunker is unsuccessful. I am not endorsing any particular way of responding to the
argument, or critiquing the Constructivist or the Moorean. I am also not arguing that
Shafer-Landau, FitzPatrick, and Vavova are in fact Mere Underminers. They may
well employ some rebutting evidence in their ultimate evaluation of the debunker,
in addition to the undermining arguments in their papers. I am, however, ruling out
Mere Undermining. Undermining is still valuable, but it must be supplemented with
some other evidence, empirical or a priori, for the reliability of our moral judgments.

19
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Bergmann (2005, 426).
See Hazlett (2012) and White (2010) for critique of these positions.

The argument also has wider implications. What I have said here applies across
the board. A general undermining fallacy is committed when someone denies (disbelieves) the conclusion of an argument while their only critique is that one premise
of the argument is unsubstantiated or inadequately supported. I suspect this situation is not uncommon in many philosophical disputes. If we find ourselves in that
mere undermining position with respect to the premises of an argument, we might
just have to be more skeptical than we would like or grant that we are doing something not easily distinguished from question begging. Undermining, by itself, is not
enough.
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